Following the 9/11 attacks, Vice President Dick Cheney advocated for a new operational paradigm, emphasizing the need to "work toward the dark side" and utilize "any means at our disposal" to achieve objectives, signaling a departure from traditional rules of engagement and secrecy in intelligence operations.
Cheney's Role in the Shootdown Decision
During the 9/11 attacks, Vice President Cheney was instrumental in authorizing the military to potentially shoot down hijacked airliners, believing he had ordered the downing of United Airlines flight 93, which had crashed in Pennsylvania.
The CIA's Post-9/11 Assessment vs. Pentagon's Iraq Focus
While the CIA, led by George Tenet, quickly identified al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden as responsible for the 9/11 attacks, figures like Rumsfeld and Cheney immediately began exploring a connection to Saddam Hussein and Iraq, indicating a pre-existing agenda to address Iraq.
Cheney and Rumsfeld's Deep Alliance
The long-standing professional relationship between Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, forged over decades through multiple administrations, created a powerful political alliance that significantly influenced the Bush administration's foreign policy and national security decisions.
CIA's Afghanistan Plan vs. Pentagon's Delay
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the CIA, under George Tenet and Cofer Black, had a ready and aggressive plan for operations in Afghanistan, but the Pentagon, led by Rumsfeld, was slow to mobilize its military forces, leading to frustration and internal conflict.
Bush's Decision: CIA First in Afghanistan
Despite pressure from Cheney and Rumsfeld to prioritize military action and potentially link Iraq to the attacks, President Bush ultimately decided to allow the CIA to lead the initial operations in Afghanistan, a decision that temporarily sidelined the Pentagon's preferred approach.
Cheney's Network and Pentagon Intelligence
Vice President Cheney strategically placed loyalists throughout key government positions and, alongside Rumsfeld, fostered the development of independent intelligence capabilities within the Pentagon, aiming to reduce reliance on the CIA and generate intelligence that supported their policy objectives, particularly regarding Iraq.
Cheney's Allegations on Mohammed Atta
Vice President Dick Cheney repeatedly claimed that Mohammed Atta, the lead hijacker in the 9/11 attacks, had met with an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague, despite CIA and FBI conclusions that this was untrue and Atta was in Florida at the time. The documentary highlights that Cheney continued to assert this connection for two years, even after intelligence agencies found no evidence.
The Hunt for Bin Laden and Shifting Focus
Following the fall of the Taliban, the CIA faced challenges in capturing Osama bin Laden due to a lack of sufficient U.S. military ground support and difficult terrain in Afghanistan. Simultaneously, military resources and personnel began redeploying from Afghanistan to prepare for a potential conflict in Iraq, indicating an early shift in strategic focus.
CIA's Lack of Evidence Linking Iraq to Al-Qaeda
Despite Vice President Cheney's continued assertions of a link between al-Qaeda and Iraq, the CIA, under Director George Tenet, conducted extensive reviews that found no evidence connecting Saddam Hussein's regime to the 9/11 attacks. This internal consensus was repeatedly communicated to the administration.
Intelligence from Tortured Suspects
Information linking Saddam Hussein to chemical weapons training for al-Qaeda originated from Ibn Sheikh al-Libi, a 'high-value terrorist' captured and subsequently tortured in Egypt. This intelligence, obtained through questionable means, was then funneled into the U.S. intelligence system and used to bolster the case against Iraq.
Expansion of Executive Power Post-9/11
Following 9/11, Cheney's legal team, including David Addington, argued for a significant expansion of presidential powers, viewing the attacks as an opportunity to reverse what they saw as a post-Watergate erosion of executive authority. This legal framework aimed to grant the president broad powers to fight the war on terror.
The Push for War in Iraq
By the spring of 2002, the administration, particularly Cheney, was convinced that war with Iraq was necessary, despite warnings from CIA officials like Mike Scheuer that invading Iraq would severely damage the counterterrorism program. The narrative suggests a predetermined path towards conflict, regardless of intelligence assessments.
WMD Allegations and the 'Smoking Gun'
Vice President Cheney presented the evidence for Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction as 'overwhelming,' stating 'there is no doubt' Saddam Hussein had them and was amassing them. This narrative was amplified through media appearances, including the controversial 'smoking gun' quote from Condoleezza Rice, despite internal intelligence disagreements.
Sen. Graham: Intelligence as PR for War
Senator Bob Graham suggests that the intelligence reports and presentations were not about informing a decision but were essentially a public relations operation to validate a pre-determined decision to go to war with Iraq.
Pillar's Regret: Intelligence for Advocacy
Paul Pillar, a key author of the intelligence white paper, expresses regret for his role, stating the document was clearly requested for policy advocacy, not to inform a decision, and its purpose was to strengthen the case for war.
Graham: Tenet's Lack of Backbone
Senator Bob Graham questions George Tenet's strength to stand up to President Bush, suggesting Tenet failed to present the intelligence accurately or forcefully enough to prevent a potentially grave mistake in Iraq.
Ford & Kay: The 'Slam Dunk' Conversation
Carl Ford recounts President Bush asking 'Is this all we got?' about WMD intelligence, to which George Tenet responded 'Slam dunk.' David Kay asserts Tenet knew the data was not solid enough for such a description, especially in the Oval Office.
Bush: The 'Yellowcake' Claim
President Bush stated in his State of the Union address that the British government had learned Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, a claim that would become known as 'yellowcake.'
Cannistraro & Drumheller: Yellowcake Implausibility
Intelligence officials Vincent Cannistraro and Tyler Drumheller indicate that the 'yellowcake' claim was not taken seriously and sounded implausible, with Drumheller stating it was never considered substantial.
Wilson: The Niger Uranium Trip
Ambassador Joseph Wilson recounts being briefed on an allegation that Iraq sought uranium from Niger, a claim the Office of the Vice President asked the CIA to investigate, leading to Wilson's trip where he found no evidence of a sale.
