How Former VP Dick Cheney Led the Charge on the War on Terror (full documentary) | FRONTLINE (PBS)

1. Cheney: Embracing the 'Dark Side'

Timestamp: 00:00:09 to 00:00:31 - watch this moment on skim

Following the 9/11 attacks, Vice President Dick Cheney advocated for a new operational paradigm, emphasizing the need to "work toward the dark side" and utilize "any means at our disposal" to achieve objectives, signaling a departure from traditional rules of engagement and secrecy in intelligence operations.

Significance (High): This statement set the tone for a more aggressive and less transparent approach to national security, laying the groundwork for controversial policies and actions in the subsequent War on Terror.

Sources in support: Dick Cheney (Vice President)

Neutral sources: Narrator (Documentary Narrator), Richard Clarke (Director NSC Counterterrorism, 1998-01), James Mann (Author, Rise of the Vulcans)

2. Cheney's Role in the Shootdown Decision

Timestamp: 00:02:07 to 00:03:15 - watch this moment on skim

During the 9/11 attacks, Vice President Cheney was instrumental in authorizing the military to potentially shoot down hijacked airliners, believing he had ordered the downing of United Airlines flight 93, which had crashed in Pennsylvania.

Significance (High): This highlights Cheney's decisive, albeit potentially mistaken, leadership in a crisis, demonstrating his willingness to take extreme measures under pressure and shaping his perception of the threat.

Sources in support: Dick Cheney (Vice President), Richard Clarke (Director NSC Counterterrorism, 1998-01)

Neutral sources: Narrator (Documentary Narrator), James Mann (Author, Rise of the Vulcans), Don Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), Meet the Press (News Program)

3. The CIA's Post-9/11 Assessment vs. Pentagon's Iraq Focus

Timestamp: 00:05:46 to 00:07:21 - watch this moment on skim

While the CIA, led by George Tenet, quickly identified al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden as responsible for the 9/11 attacks, figures like Rumsfeld and Cheney immediately began exploring a connection to Saddam Hussein and Iraq, indicating a pre-existing agenda to address Iraq.

Significance (High): This divergence in focus immediately after 9/11 foreshadowed the intense debate and eventual decision to invade Iraq, demonstrating how political objectives could influence intelligence interpretation and prioritization.

Sources in support: Don Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), James Bamford (Author, The Puzzle Palace), Ron Suskind (Author, The One Percent Doctrine)

Sources against: George Tenet (Director of Central Intelligence), John McLaughlin (Deputy Director, CIA 2000-04), Melvin Goodman (Former CIA Officer)

Neutral sources: Narrator (Documentary Narrator), George W. Bush (President of the United States), Osama bin Laden (Leader of al-Qaeda), Saddam Hussein (President of Iraq), Paul Wolfowitz (Deputy Secretary of Defense), Meet the Press (News Program)

4. Cheney and Rumsfeld's Deep Alliance

Timestamp: 00:12:08 to 00:13:30 - watch this moment on skim

The long-standing professional relationship between Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, forged over decades through multiple administrations, created a powerful political alliance that significantly influenced the Bush administration's foreign policy and national security decisions.

Significance (High): Their shared history and similar worldviews provided a strong foundation for their coordinated efforts to shape policy, particularly concerning the War on Terror and the invasion of Iraq, often presenting a united front against differing opinions.

Sources in support: James Mann (Author, Rise of the Vulcans), Ron Suskind (Author, The One Percent Doctrine)

Neutral sources: Dick Cheney (Vice President), Don Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), Narrator (Documentary Narrator), Richard Nixon (President of the United States), Gerald Ford (President of the United States), Scooter Libby (Chief of Staff to Vice President Cheney)

5. CIA's Afghanistan Plan vs. Pentagon's Delay

Timestamp: 00:14:34 to 00:16:11 - watch this moment on skim

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the CIA, under George Tenet and Cofer Black, had a ready and aggressive plan for operations in Afghanistan, but the Pentagon, led by Rumsfeld, was slow to mobilize its military forces, leading to frustration and internal conflict.

Significance (High): This delay and the Pentagon's unpreparedness highlighted a significant gap in military planning for unconventional warfare and allowed the CIA to take the initial lead, a situation Rumsfeld sought to rectify.

Sources in support: Cofer Black (CIA 1974-2002), Gary Bernsten (CIA 1982-2005), Ron Suskind (Author, The One Percent Doctrine)

Sources against: Don Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), Michael DeLong (Deputy Commander, CENTCOM 2000-03)

Neutral sources: Narrator (Documentary Narrator), George Tenet (Director of Central Intelligence), Melvin Goodman (Former CIA Officer), Northern Alliance (Afghan Opposition Group), Taliban (Afghan Ruling Party)

6. Bush's Decision: CIA First in Afghanistan

Timestamp: 00:18:40 to 00:19:40 - watch this moment on skim

Despite pressure from Cheney and Rumsfeld to prioritize military action and potentially link Iraq to the attacks, President Bush ultimately decided to allow the CIA to lead the initial operations in Afghanistan, a decision that temporarily sidelined the Pentagon's preferred approach.

Significance (High): This decision underscored the initial dominance of the CIA's counter-terrorism strategy and temporarily thwarted Cheney and Rumsfeld's immediate push for a broader military engagement, particularly against Iraq.

Sources in support: John McLaughlin (Deputy Director, CIA 2000-04)

Sources against: Dick Cheney (Vice President), Don Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), Paul Wolfowitz (Deputy Secretary of Defense)

Neutral sources: Narrator (Documentary Narrator), George Tenet (Director of Central Intelligence), Ron Suskind (Author, The One Percent Doctrine), Meet the Press (News Program)

7. Cheney's Network and Pentagon Intelligence

Timestamp: 00:24:09 to 00:27:50 - watch this moment on skim

Vice President Cheney strategically placed loyalists throughout key government positions and, alongside Rumsfeld, fostered the development of independent intelligence capabilities within the Pentagon, aiming to reduce reliance on the CIA and generate intelligence that supported their policy objectives, particularly regarding Iraq.

Significance (High): This expansion of Cheney's influence and the Pentagon's parallel intelligence efforts created a complex web of information and analysis, potentially leading to conflicting assessments and a more politicized intelligence landscape.

Sources in support: Lawrence Wilkerson (Chief of Staff, State Dept. 2002-05), Dana Priest (The Washington Post), John Brennan (Deputy Executive Director, CIA 2001-03), Douglas Feith (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), Dave Wurmser (Intelligence Analyst), 9/11 Commission Report (Official Investigation)

Sources against: Melvin Goodman (Former CIA Officer), John Brennan (Deputy Executive Director, CIA 2001-03)

Neutral sources: Narrator (Documentary Narrator), James Bamford (Author, The Puzzle Palace), Ron Suskind (Author, The One Percent Doctrine)

8. Cheney's Allegations on Mohammed Atta

Timestamp: 00:28:13 to 00:31:16 - watch this moment on skim

Vice President Dick Cheney repeatedly claimed that Mohammed Atta, the lead hijacker in the 9/11 attacks, had met with an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague, despite CIA and FBI conclusions that this was untrue and Atta was in Florida at the time. The documentary highlights that Cheney continued to assert this connection for two years, even after intelligence agencies found no evidence.

Significance (High): This point illustrates the administration's persistent effort to link Iraq to the 9/11 attacks, even when intelligence contradicted such claims. It suggests a deliberate effort to shape public and political perception.

Sources in support: Dick Cheney (Vice President), Richard Clarke (Director NSC Counterterrorism, 1998-01)

Sources against: James Mann (Author, Rise of the Vulcans), George Tenet (Director of Central Intelligence), Gary Schroen (CIA 1970-2002)

9. The Hunt for Bin Laden and Shifting Focus

Timestamp: 00:31:16 to 00:35:47 - watch this moment on skim

Following the fall of the Taliban, the CIA faced challenges in capturing Osama bin Laden due to a lack of sufficient U.S. military ground support and difficult terrain in Afghanistan. Simultaneously, military resources and personnel began redeploying from Afghanistan to prepare for a potential conflict in Iraq, indicating an early shift in strategic focus.

Significance (High): This highlights the operational difficulties in Afghanistan and suggests that the strategic priority may have already shifted towards Iraq, potentially undermining efforts to fully neutralize al-Qaeda.

Sources in support: Don Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), John McLaughlin (Deputy Director, CIA 2000-04), James Bamford (Author, The Puzzle Palace), Ron Suskind (Author, The One Percent Doctrine), Melvin Goodman (Former CIA Officer), Michael DeLong (Deputy Commander, CENTCOM 2000-03)

10. CIA's Lack of Evidence Linking Iraq to Al-Qaeda

Timestamp: 00:36:04 to 00:37:45 - watch this moment on skim

Despite Vice President Cheney's continued assertions of a link between al-Qaeda and Iraq, the CIA, under Director George Tenet, conducted extensive reviews that found no evidence connecting Saddam Hussein's regime to the 9/11 attacks. This internal consensus was repeatedly communicated to the administration.

Significance (High): This point underscores a critical disconnect between the intelligence community's findings and the public narrative promoted by the administration, raising questions about the basis for the subsequent invasion of Iraq.

Sources in support: Cofer Black (CIA 1974-2002), Lawrence Wilkerson (Chief of Staff, State Dept. 2002-05), Dana Priest (The Washington Post)

Sources against: Dick Cheney (Vice President)

11. Intelligence from Tortured Suspects

Timestamp: 00:38:05 to 00:40:02 - watch this moment on skim

Information linking Saddam Hussein to chemical weapons training for al-Qaeda originated from Ibn Sheikh al-Libi, a 'high-value terrorist' captured and subsequently tortured in Egypt. This intelligence, obtained through questionable means, was then funneled into the U.S. intelligence system and used to bolster the case against Iraq.

Significance (High): This reveals the ethically dubious methods used to obtain intelligence and highlights how information derived from torture could be incorporated into official assessments, potentially compromising their validity.

Sources in support: George Tenet (Director of Central Intelligence), John Brennan (Deputy Executive Director, CIA 2001-03), Michael Maloof (DoD 1982-2004), Taliban (Afghan Ruling Party), Michael Scheuer (CIA Officer (1982-2004))

Sources against: Douglas Feith (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), Vincent Cannistraro (Former CIA Officer)

12. Expansion of Executive Power Post-9/11

Timestamp: 00:40:37 to 00:42:21 - watch this moment on skim

Following 9/11, Cheney's legal team, including David Addington, argued for a significant expansion of presidential powers, viewing the attacks as an opportunity to reverse what they saw as a post-Watergate erosion of executive authority. This legal framework aimed to grant the president broad powers to fight the war on terror.

Significance (High): This demonstrates a proactive effort by the administration to leverage the post-9/11 environment to redefine the boundaries of presidential power, setting the stage for controversial policies and actions.

Sources in support: Gary Bernsten (CIA 1982-2005), Bob Woodward (The Washington Post), FRONTLINE (PBS Documentary Series), Richard Nixon (President of the United States)

13. The Push for War in Iraq

Timestamp: 00:42:21 to 00:43:28 - watch this moment on skim

By the spring of 2002, the administration, particularly Cheney, was convinced that war with Iraq was necessary, despite warnings from CIA officials like Mike Scheuer that invading Iraq would severely damage the counterterrorism program. The narrative suggests a predetermined path towards conflict, regardless of intelligence assessments.

Significance (High): This highlights the administration's strong inclination towards military action in Iraq, potentially overriding concerns about its impact on the broader fight against terrorism.

Sources in support: Dick Cheney (Vice President), Gerald Ford (President of the United States), Lt. Gen. Michael DeLong (Deputy Commander, CENTCOM (2000-2003))

Sources against: Lawrence Wilkerson (Chief of Staff, State Dept. 2002-05), George W. Bush (President of the United States)

14. WMD Allegations and the 'Smoking Gun'

Timestamp: 00:45:21 to 00:47:49 - watch this moment on skim

Vice President Cheney presented the evidence for Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction as 'overwhelming,' stating 'there is no doubt' Saddam Hussein had them and was amassing them. This narrative was amplified through media appearances, including the controversial 'smoking gun' quote from Condoleezza Rice, despite internal intelligence disagreements.

Significance (High): This aggressive public relations campaign aimed to solidify the case for war, creating a strong public and congressional perception of imminent threat, even as internal doubts and disagreements persisted.

Sources in support: Dick Cheney (Vice President), Scooter Libby (Chief of Staff to Vice President Cheney), Dave Wurmser (Intelligence Analyst)

Sources against: Lawrence Wilkerson (Chief of Staff, State Dept. 2002-05), Colin Powell (Secretary of State)

15. Sen. Graham: Intelligence as PR for War

Timestamp: 00:55:42 to 00:56:03 - watch this moment on skim

Senator Bob Graham suggests that the intelligence reports and presentations were not about informing a decision but were essentially a public relations operation to validate a pre-determined decision to go to war with Iraq.

Significance (High): This framing implies a severe breach of trust, where intelligence agencies may have been used to manufacture consent for a conflict, rather than providing objective analysis.

Neutral sources: Narrator (Documentary Narrator), George Tenet (Director of Central Intelligence), Douglas Feith (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), Michael Maloof (DoD 1982-2004), Richard Nixon (President of the United States)

16. Pillar's Regret: Intelligence for Advocacy

Timestamp: 00:56:11 to 00:56:37 - watch this moment on skim

Paul Pillar, a key author of the intelligence white paper, expresses regret for his role, stating the document was clearly requested for policy advocacy, not to inform a decision, and its purpose was to strengthen the case for war.

Significance (High): This admission from a primary source directly implicates the intelligence community in partisan political maneuvering, raising serious questions about its independence.

Neutral sources: Dick Cheney (Vice President), George Tenet (Director of Central Intelligence), Douglas Feith (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), Michael Maloof (DoD 1982-2004), Richard Nixon (President of the United States)

17. Graham: Tenet's Lack of Backbone

Timestamp: 00:57:30 to 00:58:09 - watch this moment on skim

Senator Bob Graham questions George Tenet's strength to stand up to President Bush, suggesting Tenet failed to present the intelligence accurately or forcefully enough to prevent a potentially grave mistake in Iraq.

Significance (High): This critique suggests a leadership failure at the CIA, where the Director may have prioritized political expediency over his duty to provide unvarnished truth to the President.

Neutral sources: George Tenet (Director of Central Intelligence), Michael Maloof (DoD 1982-2004)

18. Ford & Kay: The 'Slam Dunk' Conversation

Timestamp: 00:58:51 to 00:59:32 - watch this moment on skim

Carl Ford recounts President Bush asking 'Is this all we got?' about WMD intelligence, to which George Tenet responded 'Slam dunk.' David Kay asserts Tenet knew the data was not solid enough for such a description, especially in the Oval Office.

Significance (High): This exchange reveals a critical moment where potentially weak intelligence was presented with unwarranted confidence, suggesting a deliberate effort to bolster the case for war despite existing doubts.

Neutral sources: Gary Schroen (CIA 1970-2002), Michael Maloof (DoD 1982-2004)

19. Bush: The 'Yellowcake' Claim

Timestamp: 01:01:11 to 01:01:24 - watch this moment on skim

President Bush stated in his State of the Union address that the British government had learned Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, a claim that would become known as 'yellowcake.'

Significance (High): This assertion, later found to be based on questionable intelligence, became a cornerstone of the public case for war, significantly influencing public opinion and policy decisions.

Neutral sources: Dick Cheney (Vice President), Narrator (Documentary Narrator), Gary Schroen (CIA 1970-2002), Don Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), Melvin Goodman (Former CIA Officer), Michael DeLong (Deputy Commander, CENTCOM 2000-03), Gerald Ford (President of the United States)

20. Cannistraro & Drumheller: Yellowcake Implausibility

Timestamp: 01:01:24 to 01:01:33 - watch this moment on skim

Intelligence officials Vincent Cannistraro and Tyler Drumheller indicate that the 'yellowcake' claim was not taken seriously and sounded implausible, with Drumheller stating it was never considered substantial.

Significance (High): This reveals internal skepticism within the intelligence community regarding a key piece of evidence used to justify the war, suggesting it was pushed forward despite doubts.

Neutral sources: Gary Schroen (CIA 1970-2002), Don Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), Michael DeLong (Deputy Commander, CENTCOM 2000-03)

21. Wilson: The Niger Uranium Trip

Timestamp: 01:01:45 to 01:02:05 - watch this moment on skim

Ambassador Joseph Wilson recounts being briefed on an allegation that Iraq sought uranium from Niger, a claim the Office of the Vice President asked the CIA to investigate, leading to Wilson's trip where he found no evidence of a sale.

Significance (High): Wilson's investigation directly contradicted a key piece of intelligence used to justify the war, setting the stage for his later public critique and the subsequent controversy.

Neutral sources: George Tenet (Director of Central Intelligence), Michael DeLong (Deputy Commander, CENTCOM 2000-03), Douglas Feith (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy)

Cheney's Distrust of CIA vs. Tenet's Influence (High severity)

Type: Professional

Vice President Dick Cheney harbored a deep distrust of the CIA's intelligence assessments and capabilities, particularly after 9/11, while CIA Director George Tenet sought to assert the agency's role and influence in shaping the response.

Significance: This professional friction between Cheney and Tenet, exacerbated by Cheney's preference for Pentagon-driven intelligence and Rumsfeld's allies, created a battle for control over the narrative and strategic direction of the War on Terror, potentially compromising objective intelligence analysis.

Pentagon's Desire for Intelligence Dominance (High severity)

Type: Professional

The Department of Defense, under Donald Rumsfeld and figures like Douglas Feith, actively sought to build its own intelligence analysis capabilities, challenging the CIA's traditional monopoly and authority.

Significance: This professional rivalry and the Pentagon's creation of an alternative intelligence apparatus raised questions about the integrity of information presented to policymakers and whether intelligence was being tailored to support pre-determined policy goals, particularly regarding Iraq.

Cheney and Rumsfeld's Longstanding Alliance (Medium severity)

Type: Professional

Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld shared a decades-long professional relationship and similar worldviews, dating back to the Nixon and Ford administrations.

Significance: Their deep-seated alliance and shared political philosophy likely influenced their unified approach to national security policy post-9/11, potentially creating a powerful bloc that could marginalize dissenting views within the administration.

Intelligence Shaping for Policy Goals (High severity)

Type: Editorial

The documentary alleges that intelligence regarding Iraq's WMD and links to al-Qaeda was selectively presented, leaked, and potentially manipulated to align with the Bush administration's policy goals, particularly Cheney's desire for regime change.

Significance: This raises profound questions about the integrity of the intelligence process and whether the decision to go to war was based on objective analysis or a predetermined political agenda. The audience is left to question the reliability of information presented by government officials.

Personal Friendship vs. Objective Intelligence (Medium severity)

Type: Personal

The documentary suggests that George Tenet's personal friendship with President Bush may have influenced his willingness to challenge administration assertions about WMD, potentially compromising the CIA's independent analysis.

Significance: This potential compromise of objectivity within the intelligence community is critical. It suggests that personal relationships could override the duty to provide unvarnished truth to power, impacting national security decisions.

Intelligence Advocacy vs. Objectivity (High severity)

Type: Editorial

The documentary suggests that intelligence products, such as the white paper and the NIE, were requested and published for policy advocacy purposes, rather than objective informing of decisions, potentially compromising the integrity of the intelligence provided to policymakers and the public.

Significance: This raises profound questions about whether the intelligence community was serving its mandate to provide unbiased assessments or was co-opted to support a predetermined political agenda, thereby misleading the public and Congress.

CIA Leak Investigation and Scooter Libby (High severity)

Type: Professional

The indictment of Scooter Libby for obstruction of justice and perjury in the CIA leak investigation suggests a covert campaign to discredit Joseph Wilson, whose wife, Valerie Plame, was a CIA officer. This points to potential abuse of power and attempts to silence dissent.

Significance: The investigation into the leak of Valerie Plame's identity and the subsequent legal proceedings highlight a deep conflict between the administration's need for public support for the war and the protection of intelligence sources and methods, potentially undermining national security and the rule of law.

Tenet's Access vs. Integrity (Medium severity)

Type: Professional

George Tenet is portrayed as having traded his agency's integrity for access to policymakers, potentially compromising his role as DCI by not challenging flawed intelligence or presenting dissenting views forcefully.

Significance: This suggests a critical failure in intelligence oversight, where the pursuit of political influence may have overshadowed the fundamental duty to provide accurate, unvarnished intelligence, leading to potentially disastrous policy decisions.