The Day After: America, China and a Changed Middle East

1. Fulton sees relief but wasted months in Iran truce

Timestamp: 00:00:51 to 00:03:29

Jonathan Fulton says the US-Iran agreement to cease hostilities and reopen the Strait of Hormuz has brought cautious relief to the region, though durability depends on Israel and Lebanon holding steady. He notes the truce merely restores the February 27th status quo after months of severe economic damage to real estate, small businesses, and American deterrence.

Significance (High): Highlights how regional residents weigh war outcomes by economic destruction and eroded deterrence rather than strictly military degradation.

Sources in support: Jonathan Fulton (Political Scientist at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi; Non-resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council), Elizabeth Economy (Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Hoover Institution at Stanford University)

2. China's Middle East footprint is mainly economic

Timestamp: 00:03:29 to 00:06:45

Tracing China's regional presence since 2006, Fulton explains that Beijing's engagement surged with the Belt and Road Initiative and the 2014 1+2+3 cooperation framework. That framework prioritized hydrocarbons, infrastructure and trade, and clean energy or space, deliberately omitting politics and military cooperation. Consequently, China's footprint is deep in the Gulf, growing in North Africa, and minimal in the crisis-hit Levant.

Significance (High): Reframes Beijing's regional strategy as commercial opportunism rather than a comprehensive bid for geopolitical dominance.

Sources in support: Jonathan Fulton (Political Scientist at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi; Non-resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council)

Neutral sources: Elizabeth Economy (Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Hoover Institution at Stanford University)

3. Gulf states silo US critical AI from Chinese tech

Timestamp: 00:06:45 to 00:11:47

While traditional military cooperation remains modest, Fulton notes that Middle Eastern authoritarian governments eagerly adopt Chinese surveillance, policing, and smart-city technologies for both citizen monitoring and crowd management during the Hajj. However, in the UAE, leaders drew a sharp line by partnering their national AI champion G42 with Microsoft to exclude Chinese firms from strategic and security-linked AI.

Significance (High): Demonstrates that US pressure can exclude China from sensitive AI architecture even as Gulf cities embrace Chinese commercial tech.

Sources in support: Jonathan Fulton (Political Scientist at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi; Non-resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council), Elizabeth Economy (Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Hoover Institution at Stanford University)

4. Iran war reinforces Gulf reliance on US defense

Timestamp: 00:11:47 to 00:15:49

Fulton challenges the cliché that America only does security while China does economics, noting that China's trade is heavily imbalanced toward goods whereas US investment, education, and defense ties run far deeper. He points out that GCC states, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel build their foreign policies on US defense cooperation agreements that Beijing has no interest in matching.

Significance (High): Shows that active regional warfare exposes the ceiling of Chinese power and cements US military indispensability among Gulf elites.

Sources in support: Jonathan Fulton (Political Scientist at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi; Non-resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council)

Neutral sources: Elizabeth Economy (Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Hoover Institution at Stanford University)

5. Fulton shows China favors the GCC over Iran

Timestamp: 00:15:49 to 00:18:55

Responding to Elizabeth Economy's question on whether China avoids taking sides, Fulton argues that Beijing clearly favors the Gulf states over Iran in material terms while avoiding public declarations. He contrasts the 500,000 to 600,000 Chinese citizens and hundreds of billions of dollars in contracting in the GCC with just 2,000 to 3,000 citizens evacuated from Iran during the 12-day war and roughly $20 billion in Iranian contracting.

Significance (High): Debunks the myth of Chinese neutrality in the Middle East by comparing hard population and contracting numbers between the GCC and Iran.

Sources in support: Jonathan Fulton (Political Scientist at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi; Non-resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council)

Neutral sources: Elizabeth Economy (Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Hoover Institution at Stanford University)

6. Why a Chinese military base in Abu Dhabi stalled

Timestamp: 00:18:55 to 00:23:36

Fulton traces China's 2018 port and industrial park strategy across Khalifa Port in Abu Dhabi, Duqm in Oman, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Suez, and Israel. Addressing reports of a suspected Chinese military facility at Khalifa Port, he notes the Emiratis denied any military purpose and halted whatever was being built to avoid rupturing their core US defense relationship.

Significance (Medium): Explains the operational and diplomatic constraints that prevent China from easily converting commercial ports into Gulf military bases.

Sources in support: Jonathan Fulton (Political Scientist at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi; Non-resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council)

Neutral sources: Elizabeth Economy (Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Hoover Institution at Stanford University)

7. Oman and Iraq baked the 2023 Saudi-Iran agreement

Timestamp: 00:23:36 to 00:28:49

Examining the period of peak hype between Xi Jinping's December 2022 Riyadh visit and the October 2023 Hamas attack, Fulton argues that the March 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement was actually negotiated almost to completion by Oman and Iraq. Saudi Arabia sought to halt Houthi missile attacks to attract foreign investment, while Iran needed stability following domestic protests, and both simply used Beijing as a great-power guarantor to stamp the deal.

Significance (High): Strips away the aura of Chinese diplomatic mastery by crediting Iraqi and Omani mediators for the 2023 Saudi-Iran deal.

Sources in support: Jonathan Fulton (Political Scientist at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi; Non-resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council), Elizabeth Economy (Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Hoover Institution at Stanford University)

8. Beijing lacked diplomatic clout after October 7th

Timestamp: 00:28:49 to 00:33:07

During the recent Iran crisis, Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince visited China in April and reportedly passed messages to Tehran through Beijing, while Xi Jinping and Wang Yi issued numbered peace plans. Despite these gestures, Fulton contends China has not been a meaningful diplomatic player since October 7th, noting that Israeli China watchers were deeply disappointed by Beijing's public bashing of Israel.

Significance (Medium): Clarifies why China's numbered peace plans gain little traction during acute Middle Eastern security crises.

Sources in support: Jonathan Fulton (Political Scientist at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi; Non-resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council)

Neutral sources: Elizabeth Economy (Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Hoover Institution at Stanford University)

9. Economy and Fulton track China's long-term capacity

Timestamp: 00:33:07 to 00:39:40

Elizabeth Economy argues that Xi Jinping harbors genuine ambitions to establish overseas bases and act as a global conflict mediator selectively over time. Fulton agrees, comparing China's post-BRI investment in Middle East area studies and language training to America's early Cold War expansion of global expertise.

Significance (Medium): Identifies educational and demographic investments as the leading indicators of China's future influence in the Gulf over a 20-year horizon.

Sources in support: Elizabeth Economy (Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Hoover Institution at Stanford University), Jonathan Fulton (Political Scientist at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi; Non-resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council)

10. Fulton argues BRICS gives Iran leverage over China

Timestamp: 00:39:40 to 00:46:14

Examining BRICS expansion, Fulton notes that Saudi Arabia has sat on its invitation—likely due to Biden-era talks over a US security pact, AI support, and nuclear energy—while Iran and the UAE joined for divergent reasons. For Iran, BRICS and the SCO provide international legitimacy against Western isolation and actually give Tehran reverse leverage over Beijing, since abandoning an existing member during wartime would make Chinese-led blocs look flimsy.

Significance (High): Flips conventional wisdom by showing how Iran uses BRICS membership to extract support from China, while the UAE dilutes the bloc's anti-US agenda.

Sources in support: Jonathan Fulton (Political Scientist at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi; Non-resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council)

Neutral sources: Elizabeth Economy (Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Hoover Institution at Stanford University)

11. Chinese experts view Beijing as a third-tier player

Timestamp: 00:46:14 to 00:51:31

Asked whether China views the Middle East through a lens of strategic competition with the US, Fulton recounts a Chinese Gulf specialist telling him that Beijing sees itself as a third-tier actor behind the US, Britain, and France. He emphasizes that US Indo-Pacific partners like India, Japan, and South Korea are top regional trading partners and that an Abu Dhabi think tank report framed the UAE's strategic choice around India versus China, favoring India's deep cultural and defense ties.

Significance (Medium): Introduces India and Asian allies into the Middle East power equation, showing why China faces multipolar competition rather than a simple US vacuum.

Sources in support: Jonathan Fulton (Political Scientist at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi; Non-resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council)

Neutral sources: Elizabeth Economy (Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Hoover Institution at Stanford University)

12. Why Xinjiang fails as a wedge issue in Arab states

Timestamp: 00:51:31 to 00:59:15

Fulton explains that US and European efforts to rally Middle Eastern governments over the Uyghurs in Xinjiang fail because Arab states fear Chinese economic retaliation over Beijing's domestic core interests. Furthermore, state-owned Arab media never covers the issue, publics distrust Western narratives after decades of post-9/11 coverage, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE previously used the Turkic Uyghurs' plight to criticize rival Turkish leader Erdogan's inaction.

Significance (High): Explains why human-rights diplomacy over Xinjiang fails in the Arab world and proposes practical US-China coordination on maritime and energy stability.

Sources in support: Jonathan Fulton (Political Scientist at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi; Non-resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council)

Neutral sources: Elizabeth Economy (Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Hoover Institution at Stanford University)